Model Solution

Learning and first steps
First I solve the learning problem, which is a Kalman filtering problem. Since prior beliefs and signals are normally distributed, Bayes' rule tells us that agents' posterior beliefs about CEO ability will also be normally distributed. At the end of year t, agents' beliefs are distributed as
where τ it as the number of years completed by CEO of firm i as of the end of year t. For simplicity I drop the subscripts on τ. Agents update their beliefs about CEO ability by observing the mean-zero surprises in profitability and the additional signal:
Applying Bayes' rule, the posterior variance follows The dividend at the end of year t equals profits minus CEO pay 8) and the firm's value at the beginning of year t equals
(IA.9)
From this equation I derive the firm's stock return, the average industry return (which equals a constant plus v t ), and the stock return in excess of the industry.
Excess returns
Prediction 1 (excess returns): The excess stock return (firm minus industry) in year t equals
This equation uses the approximation that the pay-performance sensitivity b it is much less than the firm's market value, which I confirm empirically.
Proof:
First I show that the industry shock to profitability, v t , is observable. I adjust profitability and average across the N i firms k in firm i ′ s industry:
The model assumes agents know or can observe all quantities on the left-hand side, so it follows that they can also observe the right-hand side, which converges to the industry shock v t since η k − m kt−1 + ε kt has mean zero.
In the remainder of this section I drop the firm subscript i, for convenience. Also, since assets B it are constant over time, I denote them B.
The unexpected stock return is
The unexpected dividend is 
The surprise in future market value is
because firm fixed effect a i is known (hence no change in its expected value), and shocks ε and v have conditional mean zero. Combining the results above yields
The CEO's last period is T, so there are T − τ t+1 periods left at the beginning of period t + 1. In periods T + 1 and later, a new CEO is in office. Before period T, agents learn nothing about this new CEO's ability or his expected pay. Therefore we have
Decomposing into the two pieces and using fact that firm size and η are constant over time,
Starting with s = 0, we want to know
Recall that θ t+1 is known at the beginning of period t + 1 but not at the beginning of t. We therefore need to treat θ t+1 as a random variable at time t. It is possible to show that
Using results for the truncated normal distribution, and denoting ϕ (0) the pdf of the standard normal distribution evaluated at zero, we have
Using backwards induction, it follows that
Plugging this result in, we have
and the firm's stock return is
It is possible to show that the average of excess returns r t across industry firms goes to zero in the limit as the number of industry firms becomes infinite. Since all firms in the industry have the same assumed expected return E [R], then the average realized industry return R t equals
and the return in excess of the industry return equals
) .
We can also write the excess return as
The various forms of this equation will be useful in various places later in the Appendix.
While Y t and z t are normally distributed with mean zero, the excess return r t is not normally distributed, because θ t+1 is a binary discrete random variable perfectly correlated . is zero, and so is the median of θ t+1
which has the same sign as − (
. Substituting this expression into the equations above yields Prediction 1. End of proof.
Return volatility
Prediction 2 (excess return volatility):
1. In the special case with no learning, i.e., σ 2 0 = 0, or in the limit when tenure goes to infinity, then the variance of excess stock returns equals
2. In the special case in which θ up = θ down = 1, meaning the CEO captures the entire surplus from, then the variance equals 
I use Eq. (IA.31) to compute return volatility. Random variable θ t+1 depends on the sign of (m t − m t−1 ). I introduce notation that will come in handy soon:
The variance of the second term in Eq. (IA.31) is therefore
The variance of the first term in Eq. (IA.31) above is
The variance of returns therefore equals
It is possible to show that the covariance term above equals
] , so return volatility equals
Claim: Holding constant T − τ (number of years left in office) or setting T − τ to infinity, then we have
This results follows by noting lim Proof: Inspecting the expression for return variance, the term multiplying (1 − θ) is positive, so the entire term is strictly decreasing in θ.
CEO pay Prediction 3 (CEO pay):
The change in expected CEO compensation, scaled by the firm's lagged market value, equals
where g is a deterministic function given in the Appendix.
Proof:
Using the last model assumption, we have
Rearranging Eq. (IA.27) yields
Comparative statics for γ : If there is no learning, i.e., σ 0 = 0, then γ = 0 since σ 2 τ −1 = 0. Also, in limit where τ goes to infinity then we have σ 2 τ −1 = 0 and hence γ = 0. By inspection, for σ 0 > 0, slope γ is increasing in θ t , independent of firm size M t−1 or B, decreasing in signal noise σ 2 ε , increasing in initial uncertainty σ 2 0 , and independent of the additional signal's precision 1/σ z . It is straightforward to show that γ is decreasing in tenure.
Estimating the value of vesting options and restricted stock
This Appendix explains how I estimate vovest jt , the value of CEO j's options that vest during year t, and vsvest t , the value of a CEO shares that vest during year t. The value of options vesting equals the number of options vesting (novest t ) times the price of each option vesting (pvest t ):
A similar formula applies to shares vesting:
The number of options vesting during the year is To understand the formula for nsvest t , the CEO starts with a supply of unvested shares at the beginning of the year (stock unvest num t−1 ), then he or she receives some new shares (new granted num t ), then nsvest t shares vest, so the CEO is left with a supply stock unvest num t of unvested shares at the end of the year. I set nsvest t to zero if it takes a negative value. Since I do not know the exact date when the shares vest, I assume they vest at a share price psvest t midway between the starting and ending price for the year.
I estimate the price of the vesting options using the Black-Scholes formula, adjusted for dividends. I estimate the strike price K t−1 for vesting options using the method of Core and Guay (2002), as described in Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009): 
Details on Cleaning the Data
I clean the data as follows. First I fill in missing CEO indicators in Execucomp. I label an individual to be CEO in a firm/year observation if (i) Execucomp lists no one as CEO in the given firm/year, and (ii) either (a) this individual was CEO of the firm in previous and following year; (b) this individual was CEO in previous year, and we don't know who was CEO in following year; or (c) this person was CEO in following year, and we don't know who was CEO in previous year. I assume the CEO's first fiscal year is the one when he completes at least 6 full months in office. I use Execucomp variable BECAMECEO as the date the CEO started in office. I exclude observations where BECAMECEO is missing. Next I exclude all observations for those CEOs whose start date (BECAMECEO) is more than one year after their first yearly record as CEO in Execucomp; I assume these are data mistakes in Execucomp. Next I exclude firm/year observations where the CEO's first fiscal year in office is less than 6 months long; I keep these CEOs' later years in office. I cannot compute the vesting compensation measure in the CEO's first year in Execucomp, because computing the value of shares and options vesting in year t requires Execucomp data from year t − 1. Therefore, I cannot compute the change in this pay measure in a CEO's first two years in Execucomp. In years when change in pay is missing for mechanical reasons, I keep the years' stock return observation but treat the change in pay variable as missing. For other years, I delete firm/year records where change in pay is missing. I exclude firm/years where I cannot observe or forecast the CEO's total tenure T j . Next I exclude firm/years where I cannot find the firm's lagged market cap in CRSP, and then I eliminate firm/years in which the variance of excess returns is missing.
Model extension: Endogenous CEO turnover
This robustness section extends the model to allow endogenous CEO turnover and then estimates the extended model. The extended model is similar to Taylor (2010). All the assumptions are the same as in the original model, but now we assume the board chooses whether or not to fire the CEO at the beginning of each year. Firing the CEO costs the firm a fraction c of its assets. The board's goal is to maximize firm value.
The firm's dividend is now
where 1 (f ire it ) is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm fires the CEO at the end of year t. The board makes CEO firing decisions that maximize firm value.
The board's optimization problem is
where M t is the firm's market value at the beginning of year t, before the firing decision has been made.We therefore have
, since shocks v t and ε it have mean zero. We therefore have
I define ∆ t as the difference between posterior and the prior belief:
Also, I denote initial expected pay when the CEO enters office E [w 0 ] . Substituting in yields
where V * t is the value function:
The state variable is 
where
by Bayes' Rule. Since the dynamics of x depend on tenure τ, τ is also a state variable. I therefore write V * as a function: V * (x, τ ) . If the board fires its CEO, it hires a new one so that the value function resets to
If the CEO retires voluntarily, then the value function resets to
CEOs voluntarily retire after tenure year τ with probability p ret (τ ) , estimated using data on voluntary successions as in Taylor (2010). If the firm chooses not to fire its CEO, then
The firm chooses whether to fire the CEO at time t according to
Collecting results, the firm's market value equals
In simulations I choose k so that the simulated market-to-book ratio equals its empirical counterpart.
I simulate returns using the following equations:
Unexpected returns equal
Model extension: Learning about firm quality
I make the following changes in notation. For convenience I drop subscripts on several variables. a t|s and η |s denotes the posterior mean of a it and η i , respectively, at the end of period s. Therefore, η |s = m is from the original notation. Σ at|s and Σ η|s are the posterior variance of beliefs about a it and η i , respectively, at the end of period s. I drop firm subscripts i for convenience.
I write the problem in vector form to apply the multivariate version of Bayes' rule. State variable x t ≡ [ a t η ] ′ follows (as long as CEO stays in office)
Beliefs about x t at the end of period t − 1 are distributed as N (
, and beliefs about x t at end of period t are distributed as N (
. From the law of motion for x we can immediately write
When a new CEO takes office at the beginning of period t we set the off-diagonal elements of Ω t|t−1 to zero and the diagonal element corresponding to η to σ 2 0 , meaning that uncertainty about the CEO resets to the prior uncertainty while uncertainty about firm quality keeps its current value. The signal observed each period is
(IA.86)
Bayes rule states that
Next I provide an expression for excess stock returns. In the original model, excess returns are given in Eq. (IA.27). The only difference in this model is that the firm's market value moves due to changes in beliefs about a t , firm quality. The contribution of firm quality to market value at the beginning of period t is
It is straightforward to show that
The change in this contribution from the end of period t to the end of period t − 1 is
The unexpected change in the contribution is 
that comes from learning about firm quality.
I obtain predicted moments by first simulating values of state variable x t , then simulating values of the signals X t , updating beliefs according to the equations above, computing excess returns, and then taking the variance of simulated returns. I begin simulations with the variance of a t at its long-run value.
Model extension: Persistent earnings shocks
This Appendix proves the following claim: Given the definitions of x, π, and Y in robustness Section ?, the extended model's predictions are identical to those in the main model. The firm's unexpected return is
The unexpected dividend equals
Since contributions made at s < t are known at time t, we have
Since beliefs about past contributions x is→t , s < t, do not change during period t, we have
.
Substituting in Eq.
(1), the assumption that the firm fixed effect is known, and the industry shock is i.i.d. with mean zero, we have
. This equation is identical to Eq. (IA.20) in Appendix 1.2, so the predictions about excess returns will be identical as in the main model. Since the equation for Y it has not changed, the equations for learning dynamics will not change, and neither will the equations for wage dynamics.
CEO Tenure, Return Volatility, and the Variance of Profitability
Figure 2 in the main paper shows that excess stock return volatility declines after a new CEO takes office. The model attributes this decline to learning about CEO ability. In this section I test an alternate explanation, which is that earnings volatility declines with CEO tenure. First I estimate the shocks to profitability, then I check whether the volatility of these shocks changes with CEO tenure. For comparison, I confirm that return volatility declines with tenure even after including additional controls.
I compute annual return on assets (ROA) for every firm/year in the sample. I estimate earnings shocks ε it using the following panel model:
where β i is a firm fixed effect, β t is a year fixed effect, and β τ is a CEO tenure fixed effect for tenure categories τ = 1, ..., 10+ years. The conditional mean of the squared residuals,
it |regressors] , equals the conditional variance of profitability. I estimate this conditional variance from the following regression: ε 2 it = γ 0 + γ 1 log (Assets it−1 ) + γ i + γ t + γ τ + u it , (IA.103) where ε 2 it is estimated from regression (IA.102), γ i is a firm fixed effect, γ t is a year fixed effect, and γ τ is a CEO tenure fixed effect. Table 1 shows the estimated tenure fixed effects γ τ for the conditional variance of ROA. The fixed effect for tenure = 10+ years is normalized to zero. None of the tenure fixed effects is signficantly different from zero. The conditional variance of profitability shows no significant pattern with CEO tenure.
For comparison, I measure tenure fixed effects in excess return volatility. I regress RETVAR (the annualized variance of excess stock returns) on log lag assets, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, tenure fixed effects, and (in one specification) the squared shocks to ROA ( ε is significantly positive at the one (ten) percent confidence level, and the remaining fixed effects are indistinguishable from zero, consistent with the result in Figure 3 . In sum, return volatility declines significantly with tenure, but earnings volatility does not. This table shows the variance of firm profitability and excess stock returns, conditional on CEO tenure and other controls. The variance for CEOs with tenure = 10+ is normalized to zero. First I estimate shocks to return on assets (ROA) by regressing ROA on its lag, log(lag assets), firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and CEO tenure fixed effects (results not shown). I then square the estimated residuals and regress these on log lag assets, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and tenure fixed effects; estimates are below. The table also shows the tenure fixed effects from a regression of RETVAR (annualized variance of excess stock returns) on log lag assets, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, tenure fixed effects, and the squared shock to ROA. The sample contains is described in section IV.B. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
